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DUE PROCESS

supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known
608
available address, or by personal service."
Most recently, in Weigner v. City of New York, 60 9 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals used the Mullane standard in a
foreclosure proceedings. 610 In Weigner, appellant owned real
property and failed to pay taxes for more than four years. 6 11 By
receiving bills and letters from the City relating to her
delinquency, appellant knew foreclosure was pending. 6 12 The
court held that "notice by ordinary mail supplemented by
publication and posting was reasonably calculated to inform the
parties affected. Due process does not require that notice sent by
first class mail be proven to have been received. "613
In conclusion, New York and federal case law are in accord on
what type of notice is required for a tax lien proceeding to satisfy
due process. Both require actual notice be mailed when the names
and addresses of the parties are known to the municipality.
6 14
Unification Theological Seminary v. City of Poughkeepsie
(decided February 7, 1994)

The plaintiffs claimed that the single family zoning ordinance
of the City of Poughkeepsie 615 was unconstitutional because it

608. Id. at 798 ("Until 1980 ... Indiana law did not provide for notice by

mail or personal service to mortgagees of property that was to be sold for
nonpayment of taxes.").
609. 852 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1988).
610. Id. at 651.
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. Id.
,607 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1994).
614. __ A.D.2d
615. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE § 19-2.2 (1990). Definition of a Family:
(a) One (1), two (2) or three (3) persons occupying a dwelling
unit; or

Four (4) or more persons occupying a dwelling unit and
living together as a traditional family or the functional
equivalent of a traditional family.
It shall be presumptive evidence that four (4) or more persons
living in a single dwelling unit who are not related by blood,
(b)

(2)
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violated the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution. 6 16 At issue was the ordinance's rebuttable
presumption that a household of more than three unrelated
6 17
persons is not functionally equivalent to a traditional family.
The supreme court held the zoning ordinance constitutional and
the appellate division affirmed. The decision rested on two
propositions: First, that zoning ordinances cary a presumption of
constitutionality; 618 and second, that a valid rebuttable
presumption can save an otherwise facially invalid ordinance
from being declared unconstitutional. 619
The presumptive validity of zoning ordinances was originally
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1926, in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 620 In a case of first impression, the

Court held that an ordinance may only be declared
unconstitutional if its "provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." 62 1 That decision included the
finding that it is a permissible governmental objective to enact
zoning ordinances that restrict land usage to single family
marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional
equivalent of a traditional family.
(3) In determining whether individuals are living together as the
functional equivalent of a traditional family, the following criteria
must be present: ... [the code then lists four such criteria, (a),
(b), (c), and (d)]
(e) Any other factor reasonably related to whether or not the
group is the functional equivalent of a family.
Id.

616. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, which provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
617. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE, § 19-2.2. This section provides in
pertinent part: Family (2) "It shall be presumptive evidence that four (4) or
more persons living in a single dwelling unit who are not related by blood,
marriage or legal adoption do not constitute the functional equivalent of a
traditional family."
618.
A.D.2d at
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
619. Id.
620. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

621. Id. at 395 (citing Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 53031(1917)).
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dwellings in order to maintain safe, quiet, low traffic
neighborhoods. 622 This aspect of the holding is the prevailing
rule of law in both state 623 and federal decisions. 624 Thus,
subsequent due process challenges to zoning ordinances have,
like the case at hand, focused primarily on whether the means
employed by the municipality bears a substantial relation to the

permissible objective.
Since the concept of "single family" residence has consistently
been viewed as part and parcel of the permissible governmental
objective, 625 it is not surprising that the definition of family has
become the prime focus of attention. In Baer v. Town of
Brookhaven,626 the New York State Court of Appeals held that,
622. Id.'at 394 (stating that apartment houses can be characterized as
approximating a nuisance when built in detached sections).
623. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313
N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974) ("By requiring single family
use of a house, the ordinance emphasizes and ensures the character of the
neighborhood to promote the family environment. . . . Thus the city has a
proper purpose in largely limiting the uses in a zone to single-family units.");
Group House v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 380
N.E.2d 207, 209, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1978) ("It is now settled law that a
community may appropriately limit the use of certain neighborhoods to singlefamily residences."); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 549,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (1985) ("Indisputably, this
ordinance was enacted to further several legitimate governmental purposes,
including preservation of the character of traditional single-family
neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems, control of
population density and prevention of noise and disturbance.").
624. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) ("The city
seeks to justify [this single family dwelling unit ordinance] as a means of
preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and
avoiding an undue financial burden on East Cleveland's school system.
Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before us serves them
marginally, at best."); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
The town "restricted land use to one-family dwellings . . . ." Id. The Supreme
Court held that "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one. . . ." Id. at 9.
625. See, e.g., Group House, 45 N.Y.2d at 271, 380 N.E.2d at 209, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 379 ("It is now settled law that a community may appropriately
limit the use of certain neighborhoods to single-family residences.").
626. 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989).
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in order to pass due process review, a zoning ordinance may not
impose numerical limits on households composed of unrelated
individuals that are more restrictive than those imposed on
households composed of related individuals. 627 It should be noted
that this is a higher degree of protection against zoning
restrictions than that afforded by federal decisional law. In
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas628 the Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance that placed no limitations on the size of households in
which the people were related by "blood, adoption, or
marriage," but which limited the number of unrelated individuals
"living ... as a single housekeeping unit" to two. 629

In Unification Theological Seminary the plaintiffs did not
challenge the city's purpose in enacting the zoning ordinance in
question. 630 Rather, they sought to have the city code declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that the means chosen by the city
was not rationally related to that purpose. 63 1 They based their
argument on the fact that the code clearly placed a greater
627. Id. at 943, 537 N.E.2d at 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240,
498 N.Y.S.2d 128 [(1985)] we addressed the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance which limited the number and age of unrelated persons
who could dwell in a single-family home to two persons, 62 years of
age or older. We held that the ordinance was invalid because it imposed
a restriction on the number of unrelated persons residing together as a
functionally equivalent family but imposed no such restriction on related
persons. Such differentiation, we said, was not reasonably related to a
legitimate zoning purpose and, therefore, violated the State Due Process
Clause.
Id.

628. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
629. Id. at 2. The issue was peripherally revisited in Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) where the Supreme Court held an ordinance
unconstitutional because it restricted the nature of related individuals who
could comprise a single family. Id. at 518. Specifically, the ordinance
prevented a grandmother from including in her household two grandchildren
who were cousins and not brothers. Id. In reaching its decision the Court
discussed case law in the various states, acknowledging that the states have
tended to provide greater protection for the individual rights of homeowners.
Id. at 518.
630.__ A.D.2d at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
631. Id. at _, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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restriction on the number of unrelated persons who may reside
together than on the number of related individuals who may
reside together. 632 However, the appellate division held that the
city code was not unconstitutional because the restriction 633 was
in the form of a valid rebuttable presumption. 63 4 Thus, the fact
that the city provided the plaintiffs with the opportunity to make
a defense, according to factors specified in the code, 635 saved it
636
from being held invalid.
State and federal case law provide "that a rebuttable
presumption involving the imposition of civil penalties.. . is
valid if there is a rational connection between the facts proven
and the facts presumed, and there is fair opportunity for the
opposing party to make his defense." 637 This rule of law dates
back to the seminal New York State case, Board of
Commissioners v. Merchant,638 wherein the court of appeals held
that:
so

as

long

the

legislature,

in

prescribing

rules

of

evidence,... leaves a party a fair opportunity to make his

defense, and to submit all the facts to the jury to be weighed by
them, upon evidence legitimately bearing upon them, it is

607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
632. Id. at
633. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE §19-2.2 (2).
607 N.Y.S.2d at 384. ("A rebuttable presumption
634. _ A.D.2d at _,
_,

is valid if there is a rational connection between the facts needed to be proven
and the fact presumed, and there is a fair opportunity for the opposing party to

make his defense.").
635. POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y. CODE §19-2.2, (3)(e).
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
636.
A.D.2d at
637. Casse v. New York State Racing and Wagering Bd., 70 N.Y.2d 589,
595, 517 N.E.2d 1309, 1311, 523 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (1987); see also Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28 (1975) (stating that as long as
there is a rational connection between the presumption and the fact proved, the
presumption does not constitute a due process violation); Sigety v. Leventhal,
42 N.Y.2d 953, 367 N.E.2d 644, 398 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1977) (upholding the
presumptive evidence rule based on the rational connection between the
presumption and the facts proved).
638. 103 N.Y. 143, 8 N.E. 484 (1886).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 25

926

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

difficult to perceive how its acts can be assailed upon
constitutional grounds. 639
In summary, both state and federal law apply a rational basis
test when reviewing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance.
The rational basis test holds that such an ordinance is
constitutional so long as it was enacted to pursue a legitimate
governmental interest and there is a rational relationship between
the interest pursued and the means selected for the purpose.640
The state has determined that an ordinance will fail the rational
relationship prong of the test if it is more restrictive with regard
to unrelated individuals than it is with regard to related
individuals. 64 1 Federal case law has held that restrictions on
unrelated individuals in excess of those on related individuals can
be upheld. 642 Thus, an ordinance that is upheld in the face* of a
New York State due process claim is unlikely to be struck down
by a federal court, though the converse does not necessarily hold
true. Finally, the constitutionality of the use of a rebuttable
presumption to make an otherwise invalid ordinance valid, has,
to date, only been dealt with under the state law, and only at the
appellate level. On the other hand, under federal law, the city's
639. Id. at 148, 8 N.E. at 485.
640. McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 549, 488 N.E.2d
1240, 1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130-1 (1985). The court stated that:
In order for a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police
power it must survive a two-part test: (1)it must have been enacted in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) there must be
a 'reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by the
regulation and the means used to achieve that end'
Id. (citation omitted); see also City of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926) (holding that in order to be declared unconstitutional, an
ordinance must be "arbitrary and unreasonable" and have "no substantial
relation to [the police powers]".)
641. See Baer v. Town of Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 943, 537 N.E.2d
619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989) (holding that an ordinance which "restricts the
size of a functionally equivalent family but not the size of a traditional family"
violated the state constitution).
642. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding an
ordinance that did not limit the number of related individuals who could
comprise a household, but did limit the number of unrelated individuals to
two).
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ordinance would probably have passed the rational basis test even
if it had totally forbidden four or more unrelated persons from
643
living together in a single family residence.
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Hilard v. Coughlin 111644
(decided February 3, 1993)
Petitioner, prison inmate, claimed that his state 645 and
federal 64 6 constitutional rights to procedural due process were
violated when Respondents denied his request to examine the
videotapes and photographs reviewed by the Hearing Officer at
his disciplinary proceeding. 647 The third department held that the
denial of petitioner's request to reply to evidence used against
him "implicated only the right to confrontation and cross
examination" 648 since he was denied his regulatory right to reply
to evidence against him. 649 The court further held that the
evidence played a substantial role in the finding of guilt, and that
the explanations as to why petitioner could not examine the
evidence did not adequately enunciate "institutional safety and
inmate privacy considerations." 650 Accordingly, the court
65 1
granted petitioner a new hearing.

643.
644.
645.
646.

Id.
187 A.D.2d 136, 593 N.Y.S.2d 573 (3d Dep't 1993).
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.

647. Hillard, 187 A.D. at 139, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 575.

648. Id. at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
649. Id. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. V11, § 254.6(c) (1992).
When an inmate is served with a misbehavior report a hearing is conducted,
and N.Y.C.R.R. provides that "[t]he inmate... may reply orally to the
charge and/or evidence and shall be allowed to submit relevant documentary
evidence or written statements on his behalf." Id.
650. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (quoting Bernier v.
Mann, 166 A.D.2d 798, 799, 563 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (3d Dep't 1990)).
651. Hillard, 187 A.D.2d at 140, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
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